SEIZE FIRST, QUESTION LATER:
THE IRS AND CIVIL FORFEITURE

By Dick M. Carpenter II, Ph.D., and Larry Salzman
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Federal civil forfeiture laws give the Internal Revenue Service the power to clean out bank accounts without charging their owners with any crime. Making matters worse, the IRS considers a series of cash deposits or withdrawals below $10,000 enough evidence of “structuring” to take the money, without any other evidence of wrongdoing. Structuring—depositing or withdrawing smaller amounts to evade a federal law that requires banks to report transactions larger than $10,000 to the federal government—is illegal, but more importantly, structured funds are also subject to civil forfeiture.

Civil forfeiture is the government’s power to take property suspected of involvement in a crime. Unlike criminal forfeiture, no one needs to be convicted of—or even a charged with—a crime for the government to take the property. Lax civil forfeiture standards enable the IRS to “seize first and ask questions later,” taking money without serious investigation and forcing owners into a long and difficult legal battle to try to stop the forfeiture. Any money forfeited is then used to fund further law enforcement efforts, giving agencies like the IRS an incentive to seize.

Data provided by the IRS indicate that its civil forfeiture activities for suspected structuring are large and growing:

- From 2005 to 2012, the IRS seized more than $242 million for suspected structuring violations, in more than 2,500 cases.
- Structuring-related seizures are becoming more frequent: In 2012, the IRS initiated more than five times as many such seizures as it did in 2005, yielding a 166 percent increase in forfeiture revenue.
- The IRS overwhelmingly favors civil forfeiture procedures over criminal. From 2006 to 2013, nearly four out of five forfeitures for suspected structuring were civil.
- At least a third of the IRS’s structuring-related seizures arose out of nothing more than a series of transactions under $10,000, with no other criminal activity, such as fraud, money laundering or smuggling, alleged by the government.
- People whose money is seized likely face a long legal battle to win it back. The average forfeiture for suspected structuring took nearly a year to complete.
- A sizable and growing gap between what the IRS seizes for suspected structuring and what it forfeits raises concerns that the agency is seizing more than it can later justify. Altogether, of the $242 million seized, nearly half—$116 million—was not forfeited.
The surest way to prevent innocent people from losing money unjustly would be to end civil forfeiture and replace it with criminal forfeiture. Short of that, removing the financial incentive to seize, raising the standard of proof to forfeit and enacting other procedural reforms would help protect people from losing their bank accounts when the government has little or no proof of criminal wrongdoing.
Sandy Thomas remembers the day in stomach-turning detail. “[The Internal Revenue Service] just walked into [our] store and announced that they had emptied the store’s bank account.”

Sandy and her father Terry Dehko run Schott’s Supermarket, in Fraser, Mich., a suburb north of Detroit. Terry came to America for a better life from Iraq in 1970. He started a family, and in 1978 he bought Schott’s Supermarket, which has put food on his family’s table for more than 30 years by providing delicious food and great service. The store is especially well known for its deli and meat department, with dozens of varieties of custom sausages. As Schott’s has grown, its prosperity has rippled across the community, providing jobs for more than 30 people, even during bad economic times. Terry is proud of his store—the fulfillment of his American Dream.

That dream turned into a nightmare when the government grabbed $35,651 from his store’s bank account without warning. Schott’s Supermarket manages to turn a modest profit and keep people employed, but it doesn’t have money to spare. Terry needed that $35,000 to pay vendors and employees. To keep their business afloat, Terry and Sandy had to negotiate with creditors—possible only thanks to trust they had built up through years of honest dealings—and dip into their personal savings.

The IRS snatched Terry and Sandy’s money without charging them with any crime. Thanks to federal civil forfeiture laws, it didn’t have to.

Civil forfeiture is the government’s power to take property suspected of involvement in a crime. Unlike criminal forfeiture, in which the government takes the ill-gotten gains of criminal activity after an individual is convicted of a crime, civil forfeiture allows police and prosecutors to take property without charging people with, let alone convicting them of, any crime. Civil forfeiture is based on the fiction that the property itself is “guilty.” Under federal law and in most states, the proceeds of forfeited property pad the budgets of the very agencies that seize it, giving law enforcement a financial stake in forfeiture proceedings.

The civil forfeiture power plus federal laws against so-called “structuring” of bank deposits and withdrawals enables an IRS approach of “seize first, ask questions later.”

The IRS used civil forfeiture to clean out Terry and Sandy’s store bank account, claiming the funds had been illegally “structured.” Federal law requires banks to report cash transactions in excess of $10,000 to the IRS, and it is illegal to “structure” deposits or withdrawals to avoid those reporting requirements by, for example, depositing or withdrawing $9,000 at a time. The federal reporting requirements are supposed to help detect and deter financial crimes, such as money laundering and...
fraud. But, importantly, it is not illegal to make deposits or withdrawals of less than $10,000 if there is a legitimate purpose for doing so—as Terry and Sandy had.

Had the government simply asked, it would have learned that Terry and Sandy were not trying to avoid banking regulations; they were trying to avoid letting large amounts of cash accumulate on the store’s premises, where it would be vulnerable to theft. The store’s insurance policy limits coverage for theft or other loss of cash to $10,000—a common provision for small-business policies.

But the IRS did not learn any of this because civil forfeiture gives it the power to seize the money on the mere suspicion of criminal activity—no charges or conviction for “structuring” or any other crime required. For the IRS, a string of sub-$10,000 deposits was justification enough—despite Schott’s Supermarket previously earning a clean bill of health in a routine IRS audit.

After money is seized for civil forfeiture, the government must initiate forfeiture proceedings to permanently keep, or “forfeit,” it. Civil forfeiture proceedings require property owners like Terry and Sandy to engage in a lengthy and expensive court battle to try to get their money back. Terry and Sandy were fortunate that the Institute for Justice took their case pro bono; many property owners cannot afford to hire counsel. And because it is a civil, not criminal, process, the government need only prove the money is connected to a crime by a “preponderance of the evidence,” a standard well below the “beyond a reasonable doubt” threshold required for convictions.

Neither the IRS nor the Treasury Department publicly reports how much it seizes or forfeits for suspected structuring violations, so the Institute for Justice sought data through a freedom-of-information request to the IRS. The IRS is likely the most active agency pursuing structuring cases in the Treasury Department, but it is not the only one, so data reported here may undercount forfeiture actions for suspected structuring.
importantly, it is not illegal to make deposits or withdrawals of less than $10,000 if there is a legitimate purpose—as did Terry and Sandy.
**The IRS’s Growing Use of Forfeiture for Suspected Structuring**

From 2005 to 2012, the IRS seized more than $242 million for suspected structuring violations, originating from more than 2,500 cases. From 2006 to 2013 the agency forfeited, or kept, $123 million from 1,745 cases. As shown in Table 1, half of these seizures were for less than $34,000, almost identical to the amount seized from Schott’s Supermarket. Half of forfeitures were for less than $28,000. Such modest amounts call into question whether people losing their assets are the terrorist money launderers or headline-grabbing financial fraudsters that laws against structuring are meant to target.

**Table 1: Total IRS Seizures and Forfeitures for Suspected Structuring**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Actions</th>
<th>Total Value</th>
<th>Mean Value</th>
<th>Median Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seizures (2005-2012)</td>
<td>2,501</td>
<td>$242,627,129</td>
<td>$97,012</td>
<td>$34,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forfeitures (2006-2013)</td>
<td>1,745</td>
<td>$123,433,274</td>
<td>$70,735</td>
<td>$27,309</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with forfeiture generally (see sidebar on the next page), IRS seizures and forfeitures for suspected structuring have grown substantially over time, as shown in Table 2 (page 12). In 2012, the IRS initiated more than five times as many structuring-related seizures than it did in 2005, and funds seized jumped 96 percent. Forfeitures increased three-fold from 2006 to 2013, yielding a 166 percent increase in revenue.
BEYOND SUSPECTED STRUCTURING, FORFEITURE ON THE RISE

The IRS is not the only law enforcement agency using forfeiture to seize more and more assets. Agencies across the federal government have enlarged their forfeiture coffers substantially in recent years. Two funds—the Department of Justice’s Assets Forfeiture Fund (AFF) and the Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF)—process forfeiture deposits from and make money available to departments within their agencies. In 2001, these two funds held $763 million—already a significant sum—in net assets, but by 2012, the combined holdings exploded to almost $3.2 billion, a 316 percent increase in a little more than a decade.¹

But federal agencies are not alone in the forfeiture take. Both the Department of Justice and the Treasury Department run “equitable sharing” programs that allow state and local law enforce-

ment to collaborate on forfeitures and split the proceeds, with state and local agencies receiving as much as 80 percent—even in states that bar agencies from receiving forfeiture proceeds or that set higher standards for forfeiting property. Equitable sharing has likewise grown: State and local agencies took in $558 million in 2012, an increase of more than two-and-a-half times since 2002.²

Research indicates that giving law enforcement agencies a financial stake in forfeiture proceeds encourages seizures.³ A recent study found that state and local agencies were more likely to forfeit property through the federal equitable sharing program than under their own state systems when doing so boosted their chances of securing forfeiture revenue, suggesting that pursuit of forfeiture dollars was a motivation.⁴ And a recent experiment concluded that the profit motive in civil forfeiture laws creates a strong temptation for law enforcement to seize property to pad their own budgets.⁵

### Table 2: Annual Growth of IRS Seizures and Forfeitures for Suspected Structuring, 2005 to 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Seizures</th>
<th></th>
<th>Forfeitures</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>Total Value</td>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>Total Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>$24,765,672</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>$19,447,782</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>$22,776,270</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>$20,940,702</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>$16,414,697</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>$48,548,698</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>$41,153,812</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>$48,579,495</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, IRS structuring-related forfeitures and forfeiture revenues grew basically steadily year to year, but seizures and funds seized spiked from 2009 to 2010. The data do not provide any guidance on why this might be, but it could be a consequence of a series of high-profile and substantial financial frauds that came to light in 2008 and 2009. These included cases against Bernie Madoff, the Stanford Bank and Stanford Industries, Joseph Forte, Mark Drier, Tom Petters and Scott Rothstein. Though they did not involve structuring violations, these cases may have raised awareness of or concern about financial misdealings and led agents to step up efforts to identify suspected banking-law violations by looking for suspicious patterns of deposits and withdrawals. Such heightened scrutiny of financial transactions may have swept up more than just potential fraud cases, resulting in a significant spike in 2010.
**Figure 1: Annual IRS Seizures and Forfeitures for Suspected Structuring, 2005 to 2013**

**Figure 2: Funds Seized and Forfeited Annually by IRS for Suspected Structuring, 2005 to 2013, in Millions**
CIVIL VERSUS CRIMINAL FORFEITURE FOR SUSPECTED STRUCTURING

When the IRS seizes money for suspected structuring, law enforcement agents can seize under criminal forfeiture statutes, which require criminal charges and a conviction for a forfeiture, or civil forfeiture statutes, which require neither. Civil forfeiture is considerably easier for the government and harder for property owners to fight.\textsuperscript{17} As Table 3 indicates, the IRS overwhelmingly chooses the civil route: From 2005 to 2012, 86 percent of IRS seizures for suspected structuring were civil actions.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Seizures & Percentage of Total & Total Value \\
\hline
Civil & 2,139 & 86\% & $199,901,775 \\
Criminal & 362 & 14\% & $42,725,354 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

For money that was ultimately forfeited, the IRS data also indicate whether it was forfeited through a civil or criminal process. Sometimes property seized under criminal statutes will be processed under civil procedures, or vice versa; this was the case for a small number of seizures in the IRS data.\textsuperscript{19} Civil forfeitures are actions brought against the money itself and can be either “civil judicial” or “administrative.”\textsuperscript{20} In either case, the government must notify the owner of intent to forfeit the property. If the property owner fails to meet the strict, short deadlines required to contest the seizure, the IRS may unilaterally declare the property forfeited—known as an administrative forfeiture—and keep it without any hearing before a judge. If the property owner makes a timely claim, the government must file a formal “civil judicial” forfeiture action in federal court to continue the forfeiture.\textsuperscript{21}
Criminal forfeiture is brought as a part of the criminal prosecution of a defendant property owner. If the defendant is convicted and the property is deemed forfeitable, the court issues an order of forfeiture.22 As shown in Table 4, nearly 80 percent of IRS structuring-related forfeitures from 2006 to 2013 followed civil processes, while only 21 percent were criminal.

**Table 4: IRS Forfeitures for Suspected Structuring, Civil vs. Criminal, 2006 to 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forfeitures</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
<th>Total Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Judicial</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Judicial</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTHING BUT STRUCTURING SUSPECTED

For seizures, the IRS data specify which part of federal anti-structuring law the agency suspected was violated. The government can seize assets because it suspects someone is structuring to hide criminal activity, such as money laundering, fraud or smuggling. (Even when criminal activity is suspected, the government can pursue civil or criminal forfeiture.) But under a different part of federal law, the government can seize money because someone appears to be structuring transactions for the sole purpose of avoiding reports to the federal government, with no further criminal activity alleged.

This part of anti-structuring law is particularly likely to trap the unwary. Like the Dehkos, Carole Hinders of Spirit Lake, Iowa, had no idea what “structuring” was or that it was illegal. For almost 40 years, Carole owned and operated Mrs. Lady’s Mexican Café in Spirit Lake, a rural vacation spot.
90 miles outside of Sioux City. Because she operated a cash-only restaurant, she made frequent cash deposits at her bank. In August 2013, the IRS cleaned out her restaurant’s $32,821 bank account without charging her with any crime. The IRS did not accuse Carole of money laundering or fraud; it claimed only that her deposits were structured to evade reporting requirements. Only after the Institute for Justice took her case did the IRS agree to return her money—more than a year-and-a-half after it was seized.

From 2005 to 2012, more than one third of the IRS’s structuring-related seizures were civil actions like Carole’s—civil actions where only structuring was implicated. Another 48 percent of seizures were also civil, but data indicate that the IRS suspected that structuring was intended to hide some other criminal activity, though it is not clear whether the IRS ever proved any criminal activity happened: Civil forfeiture laws do not require it, and the data do not indicate whether related criminal charges were in fact filed or convictions obtained. A minority of seizures, a little more than 14 percent, were criminal. Like IRS structuring-related forfeitures generally, funds taken through structuring-only civil forfeiture actions have increased substantially (see Figure 3). From 2005 to 2012, seizure amounts rose 111 percent, and from 2007 to 2013 forfeiture amounts jumped 490 percent.25

**Figure 3: Funds Seized and Forfeited by IRS for Suspected Structuring Only, 2005 to 2013, in Millions**
HOW LONG FORFEITURES TAKE

For property owners, the forfeiture process, whether civil or criminal, is byzantine in its complexities, requiring not only legal counsel to navigate but also the patience and resources necessary to endure a prolonged fight for the return of property. As Table 5 indicates, from 2005 to 2012, IRS structuring-related forfeitures took, on average, nearly a year—356 days—to complete from seizure to forfeiture. Civil forfeitures for structuring only took even longer—375 days. Not surprisingly, judicial forfeitures took considerably longer than administrative forfeitures; civil judicial forfeitures, in fact, took more than twice as long as those completed administratively.

Unfortunately, the IRS data do not indicate how long it takes property owners who get their property back to see the return of their funds; the data only provide dates for forfeitures, not for the return of seized property that does not result in a forfeiture. But the forfeiture dates suggest that property owners may wait a long time. It takes an average of 460 days for the IRS to forfeit currency through a civil judicial process. It likely could take a property owner caught up in the same process as long to get her money back, even when the civil judicial case is dropped. For their part, Terry Dehko and Sandy Thomas waited almost a year to receive their funds back.

The Hirsch brothers, owners of the Bi-Country Distributors in New York, waited even longer. In May 2012, the IRS seized more than $446,000, everything in their company’s bank account, and it took until January 2015 for the IRS to agree to give the money back. In all that time, the Hirsches were unable to contest the seizure before a judge because the government never formally moved to forfeit the property.
In October 2014, IJ challenged the IRS’s delay tactics as an unconstitutional violation of the Hirsches’ due process rights and a violation of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act and demanded the government return the funds. Had the government filed a civil forfeiture complaint, the Hirsch brothers would have had the opportunity to show that their frequent sub-$10,000 cash deposits were for a legitimate business purpose, not to avoid banking regulations. Bi-County Distributors is a family-owned company that distributes candy and cigarettes to convenience stores on Long Island, and its customers often pay in cash. Bi-County has had several banks close its accounts in recent years because, the Hirsches were told, the banks did not want the hassle of dealing with a cash-intensive business. To avoid burdening banks and in hopes of keeping their accounts open, the brothers began making smaller deposits.

Before taking the Hirsches’ money, the IRS made no serious attempt to investigate their business or understand why they made frequent cash deposits. After the seizure, the IRS turned a blind eye to evidence showing the money was legitimately earned and denied the brothers an opportunity to make their case in court. What the Hirsches experienced was not “seize first and ask questions later,” but “seize first and ignore questions later.” While the IRS held onto the cash, the brothers struggled to keep their business afloat. Their ordeal illustrates the hardships faced by those deprived of funds for months or even years.

At two years and nine months, Bi-County’s wait was more than double the average wait indicated in the data for this report, but some cases have taken considerably longer. As shown in Table 5, the longest forfeiture, which was disposed of through a civil judicial process, took more than 6.5 years (2,390 days).

### Table 5: Days Between Seizure and Forfeiture, IRS Structuring-Related Seizures, 2005 to 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average days between seizure and forfeiture</th>
<th>Maximum days between seizure and forfeiture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>1,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Judicial</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>2,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Judicial</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>2,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Properties</td>
<td>356</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Structuring Only</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>2,026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IS THE IRS SEIZING MORE THAN JUSTIFIED?

Figures 1 and 2 (page 13) show sizable and apparently growing gaps between the IRS’s structuring-related seizures and its forfeitures, both in the number of cases and in the amount of money taken. The gaps raise concerns that the IRS is seizing more than it can later justify.

Altogether, of the $242 million the IRS seized for suspected structuring from 2005 to 2012, nearly half—$116 million—was not forfeited. In half of seizures, the IRS forfeited less than it seized; in another 31 percent, the IRS did not forfeit any of the funds seized.

Seizures that failed to yield a forfeiture are on the rise, as illustrated by Figure 4. In 2007 and 2009, 83 percent of IRS structuring-related seizures resulted in the forfeiture of at least some funds, but by 2012, just 64 percent of seizures led to a forfeiture. Successful civil forfeitures for suspected structuring alone showed a similar drop.

FIGURE 4: PERCENTAGE OF IRS STRUCTURING-RELATED SEIZURES THAT RESULTED IN FORFEITURE, 2005 TO 2012

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The amount of money taken in seizures that failed to yield a forfeiture likewise grew, as shown in Figure 5, particularly between 2009 and 2010, when the value of such seizures jumped from nearly $3 million to $24.5 million—a 715 percent increase. As with the spike in funds seized shown in Figure 2, this increase could be the result of greater attention paid to financial fraud in the wake of high-profile scandals. Yet, as the IRS was seizing more cash, its forfeiture success rate was declining. If heightened concern about financial fraud was behind the seizure increase, it appears not to have led to more seizures that were justified, but perhaps instead to overzealous seizing by the IRS.

**Figure 5: Total Value of Seizures That Did and Did Not Result in Forfeitures, 2005 to 2012, in Millions**

Unfortunately, the IRS data do not explain why the IRS might forfeit substantially less than it seizes, but there are a few possible reasons. In some cases, the IRS might have reached a settlement with the property owner. The IRS might settle for a smaller amount to avoid protracted litigation, even if it has a strong case that the funds were intentionally structured, either to evade reporting requirements or to hide other criminal activity. Conversely, a property owner, even an innocent one, might agree to take some
percentage of the seized amount back and allow the rest to be forfeited to avoid costly litigation and risk losing the full amount. The IRS offered Terry and Sandy such a deal, proposing to return 20 percent of their money, an offer that was refused.

But others elect to cut their losses and accept a settlement. In 2011, the IRS seized $62,936 from the South Mountain Creamery, owned by Maryland farmers Randy and Karen Sowers. The money was generated from cash sales at farmers markets, and a bank teller advised Randy and Karen that deposits in excess of $10,000 required the bank to complete a special form. To avoid creating unnecessary paperwork, they began making deposits of less than $10,000. The Sowers committed no crime other than systematically depositing less than $10,000 to avoid paperwork. Randy and Karen challenged the seizure of their funds, but facing steep litigation costs, they later accepted the government’s offer to return about half of their money.

Another possible reason that seized money may not all be forfeited is that a prosecutor determined that the IRS had seized more than it had authority to seize and returned some of the seized funds while moving to forfeit the rest. For instance, the IRS
can typically only forfeit funds for suspected structuring going back one year. If the agency or the prosecutor determines some seized funds were deposited earlier, it might return them. Or the agency or prosecutor might decide after a seizure that it has too little evidence to substantiate an alleged structuring violation for part or all of the funds and return them.

This happened with another Michigan business owner and IJ client, Mark Zaniewski. In 2013, the IRS cleaned out his gas station’s account, alleging the funds were structured. To avoid bouncing checks to vendors, he replenished the account with borrowed funds and earnings from his business—after the IRS told him he could do so without fear of a second seizure. But the IRS then seized the newly deposited funds. After Zaniewski provided proof that these funds could not have been structured cash deposits, the agency offered to return the money from the second seizure if he would give up the funds from the first seizure. He refused, and the IRS finally returned the money from the second seizure after holding it for six months.

A final explanation for a gap between seizures and forfeitures would be an IRS loss in civil or criminal court, or a judge’s determination that only a portion of the seized funds were eligible for forfeiture.

Whatever the explanation, substantial gaps between seizures and forfeitures are troubling. They suggest the IRS might be seizing more than can ultimately be justified to a prosecutor or court, depriving people of rightfully earned funds perhaps for months or years while the forfeiture process plays out and requiring them to hire legal counsel to win their money back. Seizure-forfeiture gaps are particularly worrisome given the “seize first, ask questions later” approach to law enforcement made possible by civil forfeiture laws in combination with laws against structuring. Because civil forfeiture sets such a low bar to seize funds—and gives the government a financial stake in doing so—it should not be surprising to see seizures that cannot survive scrutiny.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

On October 26, 2014, The New York Times exposed the IRS’s structuring-related forfeiture activities, reporting some of the numbers we secured through the freedom-of-information request and featuring Carole Hinders and the Hirsch brothers.36 In response to scrutiny by the Times, the IRS announced it would adjust its policy to focus on “cases where the money is believed to have been acquired illegally or seizure is deemed justified by ‘exceptional circumstances.’” However, any change in practice will not apply to seizures and forfeitures already underway37 and does not change the law. As long as the law remains as is, individuals remain at risk for the loss of their property.

The surest way to stop structuring-related seizures once and for all is to end civil forfeiture entirely and replace it with criminal forfeiture. People who have never been convicted, or never even charged, in criminal court should not lose their property in civil court.

People who have never been convicted, or never even charged, in criminal court should not lose their property in civil court.

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it would reduce the number of seizures considerably, particularly those perpetrated with the flimsiest of evidence. Moreover, property owners would be afforded the greater protections that come with criminal proceedings, not least of which includes the presumption of innocence.

Short of eliminating civil forfeiture, lawmakers should remove the perverse financial incentive law enforcement agencies have to pursue civil forfeiture by requiring that forfeited funds be deposited in a neutral account, such as a general fund, and increase the standard of proof required for forfeiture.

Reforming forfeiture procedures to require a prompt post-seizure hearing after the seizure of currency would also extend greater due process protections to property owners. Federal civil forfeiture law does not allow for a prompt post-seizure hearing after the seizure of currency.
zure hearing when currency is seized. This means cases can languish months and even years before property owners have an opportunity to contest the seizure before a neutral magistrate—among the most fundamental requirements of due process. Federal law does, however, prescribe a post-seizure hearing for non-monetary property, although only after the property owner files a hardship petition. Federal forfeiture law should be changed to consistently require a prompt post-seizure hearing for all property types, and no hardship petition should be required to trigger that hearing.

Finally, the basic due process principle of fair notice should be applied to the prosecution of civil forfeiture for structuring. Structuring laws were aimed at combating serious criminals. But the government has prosecuted structuring cases against people completely unaware of what structuring is or that it is illegal. Sometimes people engage in transactions on the poor advice of bank tellers or accountants in an attempt to maintain their financial privacy. People who are not structuring to conceal any underlying criminal activity have little reason to consider or know that it is illegal to deposit their own lawfully earned money in their own bank accounts to avoid what they perceive as unnecessary or intrusive government reporting. Seizing and forfeiting money for nothing more than this violates the basic due process principle of fair notice and deprives people of an opportunity to conform their behavior to the law.
CONCLUSION

Upon learning of the IRS’s money grab from his store’s bank account, Terry Dehko exclaimed, “Aren’t we in the United States? We did nothing wrong.” Unfortunately, there is an upside-down world within the United States in which people who do nothing wrong, like Terry and Sandy, are presumed guilty, face a Kafkaesque process in an attempt to get their money back and wait months or years for resolution of their cases.
Seizures for suspected structuring are becoming more frequent, and the amount of money seized is substantial and growing. The amount ultimately forfeited, however, diverges significantly from what was seized, suggesting overzealous seizures and prosecution by the government. Moreover, the vast majority of structuring-related seizures are initiated and eventually processed through civil procedures, meaning property owners are not convicted of, let alone charged with, any crime.41 And at least a third of seizures originated not out of suspicion of activities normally thought of as crimes, such as fraud, money laundering or smuggling, but from the mere act of making transactions under $10,000, a common practice among cash-intensive businesses.

What makes structuring-related civil forfeiture even more pernicious is the financial stake the IRS and prosecutors have in the process. Forfeited money is used to fund further law enforcement efforts, creating a perverse incentive to pursue monetary gain rather than the impartial application of the law, which may explain the “seize first, ask questions later” approach and the decreasing rate of seizures converted to forfeitures.

The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that “individual freedom finds tangible expression in property rights”42 and that property rights cannot be “relegated to the status of a poor relation” in comparison to other constitutional rights.43 Citizens losing property absent a conviction, let alone an indictment, for any crime and waiting months and even years for the fulfillment of their due process rights epitomizes “the status of a poor relation.” In a 2014 civil forfeiture case, the presiding judge noted that the absence of an underlying criminal indictment of the property owners “create[d] some pause”:

Even the most ardent law and order advocate would likely recognize the legitimate civil liberty concerns that arise from the federal government’s taking of personal property as the fruit of a crime when neither the federal government nor any state has chosen to indict the alleged perpetrators for the underlying criminal activity.44

The data presented in this report demonstrate why concerns about civil forfeiture are growing and why forfeiture laws require serious reform to return property rights to their central role in the expression of individual freedom.
**ENDNOTES**

6. Our request for structuring data began with the Treasury Department. That yielded no useful data and an admonition that data we sought would have to be obtained from each agency individually. Since the IRS is likely the most active agency in structuring, we began there first.
7. The data provided by the IRS refer to fiscal years, not calendar years, so all years in this report should be understood as fiscal years.
8. In analyses like this, the median (i.e., the middle) is the better measure of averages, as the mean is influenced by extreme figures at one end or another of a distribution of numbers.
9. The first complete year for which seizure data were made available by the IRS was 2005. We chose 2012 as the final year of seizures in the analyses to allow for sufficient time to pass for those seizures to turn into forfeitures, if, in fact, they were to do so. We used 2013 as the final year of forfeiture data, as it represented the final full year of these data available from the IRS. Since, as Table 5 indicates, seizures take, on average, approximately a year to turn into forfeitures, many if not most seizures from 2012 would be captured in the 2013 forfeitures (if they turn into such). However, some successful seizures do take longer than a year, so there may be a small number of seizures in 2012 that eventually turned into successful forfeitures sometime after 2013 but would not be captured as such here.
10. This comparison used 2006 since 2005 likely was not a complete year of forfeitures.
18. For a small percentage of cases, the coding appears inconsistent between, for example, the statute under which a property was seized and how it was processed. For instance, some properties may have been seized under the civil structuring statute (31 U.S.C. § 5317 (c) (2)) but processed as a criminal judicial forfeiture. In other examples, properties were seized under criminal statutes (i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 982) but processed administratively or civil judicially. These inconsistencies likely reflect a change in the status of a case or a decision made by a prosecutor to change the status of a case as it proceeded through its life cycle. This means numbers or percentages compared between tables and figures may differ slightly.
In almost 10 percent of cases, property was seized under one type of procedure and processed under another. A little more than seven percent were seized under civil statutes and processed as criminal. A little more than two percent were seized under criminal statutes and processed as civil.

Administrative forfeiture is less costly and less time-consuming to the government than civil judicial forfeitures. Moreover, in 1984 and again in 1990, Congress made administrative forfeitures simpler for the government. Prior to 1984, administrative forfeitures could only be commenced for property valued at less than $10,000; after 1984, as a result of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, the threshold increased to $100,000, but only violations of customs law could be processed as administrative forfeitures. In 1990, as part of the Customs Trade Act, the threshold increased again to $500,000, and the scope broadened to include monetary instruments under other laws.

The first year in which forfeitures for structuring only appeared in the data was 2007.

The seizure at Schott’s Supermarket was processed as a civil judicial forfeiture. The money was returned only after the government missed a procedural deadline. Presumably, had that not happened the forfeiture would have been decided by a judge.
The judge upheld the forfeiture, however, because “the forfeiture statutes enacted by Congress permit such aggressive pursuit of the fruit of theoretically indictable, yet not actually indicted, crimes. Perhaps more importantly, any judge should know that the same Constitution that protects those civil liberties also constrains the Court from rewriting those forfeiture laws or purposely misconstruing the evidence to reach a particular result.” Id. Such logic ignores an essential role of the judiciary—determining the constitutionality of laws passed by legislative bodies. The fact that judges allow these laws to stand and approve the “aggressive pursuit” of forfeiture further emphasizes why reform of these laws is so important.
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