Georgia

Municipalities may use authority under a charter to enact ordinances against harmless conduct or vaguely defined offenses and then enforce those provisions to raise revenue.

If municipalities can enact provisions regulating the same or similar conduct as state laws, they may direct law enforcement to issue citations under municipal ordinances instead of state law to divert cases, and thus revenue, from state courts to municipal courts and treasuries.

Municipal courts must often raise their own funds from fees they collect in cases brought by municipalities, or else depend on municipalities to fund their staffing and operations, making them susceptible to municipal pressure to convict and impose fines on people.

Broader jurisdiction can bring more prosecutions to municipal courts, including some violations of state law. The fines from cases involving violations of state law often go to the state, but municipal courts can still receive fees from those cases.

If municipalities can plan to receive fines and fees revenue, there is a danger law enforcement and courts will make, or be pressured to make, decisions for financial reasons and not public safety or justice.

With more options for matching revenue-raising tools to local economic conditions, municipalities may rely less on fines and fees.

If municipalities can retain fines and fees revenue only up to a cap, there is no financial incentive beyond that point for them to use code enforcement to raise revenue rather than to protect the public.

Municipalities’ financial incentive to levy fines and fees is negated to the extent such revenue is directed to a fund beyond municipal control.

If municipal courts do not have to self-fund via fees, or depend on municipalities to fund them out of court fines, they may feel less pressure to convict and levy fines and fees on people.

If the state cannot require municipalities to furnish new or additional services without providing a corresponding source of funding, municipalities may face less fiscal stress and, in turn, place less pressure on municipal courts to raise funds by levying fines and fees on people.

If municipal courts must function independently from the political branches of municipal government, any pressure they face to convict or coerce guilty pleas may be less effective.

If the personal (e.g., salary, commission, job security or promotion prospects) and institutional (e.g., funding) interests of municipal court personnel are shielded from municipal reprisals, municipal court personnel may face less pressure, have less incentive for abuse and be better able to carry out their duties neutrally.

Enforcing higher ethical and professionalism standards creates greater accountability for municipal court personnel. This, in turn, may promote greater neutrality and competency among personnel and lower the risk of abuse.

If permitted, municipal courts may require in-court payment for more offenses, which increases the likelihood people will miss appearances and therefore accrue additional fees.

If municipalities must provide options for paying fines and fees other than appearance in court, it is likely there will be fewer missed appearances and so less risk of late fees being levied.

Where a court’s fines and fees schedule is easily accessible, people can attend court prepared to pay the total amount owed for a given offense or to remit payment via another option if available. This reduces the likelihood of return trips to court to pay the correct amount as well as the risk of incurring additional fees for late payments.

Acceptance of partial payments reduces the risk people will incur late fees and penalties because they cannot pay in full.

Suspending a driver’s license is powerful leverage to coerce full payment of fines, so the more cases subject to license suspension, the more widespread the risk of coercion.

The more cases subject to license suspension, the more widespread the potential to coerce immediate payment of fees.

If permitted, courts may refuse to lift driver’s license suspensions after receiving partial payments, thus maintaining pressure on those owing fines and fees to make payment in full.

Providing a description of the alleged code violation reduces the risk of citations for contrived or vague offenses to raise revenue and enables the person cited to understand and respond to the accusation.

Providing the section number(s) of the municipal code said to be violated reduces the risk of citations for contrived or vague offenses to raise revenue and enables the person cited to understand and respond to the accusation.

Including the name and address of the accused makes it more likely the correct person will be served. This reduces the risk of compounding fines or even arrest as citations go unresolved because they were not received.

Including the name of the issuing person or municipality serves as a check on whether the municipality has jurisdiction over the person cited or the property at issue. It also informs the person cited of the entity bringing the case against them.

Clearly instructing the accused to appear in court at a stated time and place reduces the risk of missed court dates and associated fees.

Without notice, people may not be aware they can (a) contest citations without appearing in court and so feel coerced into payment if they cannot attend or (b) pay citations without attending court and so needlessly waste time and money going to court.

Cautioning that arrest is possible if a person does not attend court or follow an alternate procedure reduces the risk of arrest and accrual of related fees.

Notification of the procedure to assert one’s right to jury trial, if applicable, reduces the risk that people are deprived of the right because they do not properly claim it.

Discovery in municipal ordinance prosecutions allows the accused to know the case against them, gather evidence, and properly prepare a defense.

A jury trial permits the accused to be tried by impartial third parties, rather than by municipal judges who may face municipal pressure to convict.

Notification of the right to jury trial, if applicable, reduces the risk that people are deprived of that right because they are not aware of it.

The higher the burden of proof the municipality must clear in making its case, the less risk of municipalities bringing frivolous cases solely to raise revenue.

If municipalities must clear a higher burden of proof to convict in cases where incarceration can be ordered, the threat of incarceration may be less effective in coercing guilty pleas and payments.

A right of appeal safeguards justice by offering the accused access to state courts, free from potential institutional interests in the outcome, and promotes municipal court accountability through review of their judgments.

In line with the basic principle of fairness that underpins the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy, people whose cases have been dismissed should not have to face possible conviction twice.

A cap on the fines that can be assessed per offense restrains municipalities from setting exorbitant fines and limits pressure on the accused to plead guilty in order to avoid more crippling financial punishment.

A cap on fees and a ban on new fees may prevent municipalities and municipal courts from evading caps on fines to earn revenue. Regulating fees may also prevent municipalities from setting fees far in excess of the value of services provided.

If judges are not bound by minimum fines in the municipal code, they can set lower fines to account for mitigating circumstances and ability to pay.

Where municipal courts incorporate into their orders the amounts of court or prosecution fees being assessed, court personnel may be less likely to levy fees or charges not authorized by law. Inclusion of this information also reduces confusion about the precise amounts owed.

Specifying the names of any fees assessed provides some transparency as to the fees owed and their respective amounts.

It is fundamentally fair that only those convicted or pleading guilty or no contest pay court fees. If municipalities must secure a conviction or guilty plea before court fees can be levied, this also reduces their financial incentive to bring frivolous cases.

If courts offer non-jail alternative punishments, the accused may feel less pressure to plead guilty and pay fines and fees to avoid jail.

The U.S. Supreme Court has long held it unconstitutional to incarcerate people economically unable to pay fines and fees. This prohibition may be better observed where states incorporate it into their own laws.

It is unconstitutional to threaten people with incarceration for inability to pay or to circumvent the U.S. Constitution’s ban on incarceration for inability to pay by incarcerating for contempt of court those unable to pay. These prohibitions may be better observed where states incorporate them into their own laws.

The U.S. Constitution’s prohibition on incarceration for inability to pay may be better observed where states include in their laws the requirement for ability-to-pay hearings.

Reasonable notice of an ability-to-pay hearing gives the accused time to instruct counsel, compile evidence of their income and expenses, and prepare argument, which may help prevent unconstitutional incarceration for inability to pay.

Providing notice of the right to counsel enables people to exercise that right. Counsel facilitates a fair hearing by assisting the accused in navigating the legal process and asserting their rights. It may therefore help protect against unconstitutional incarceration for inability to pay.

Municipal courts may be less likely to incarcerate for inability to pay in violation of the U.S. Constitution if they must consider a person’s actual financial situation and obligations in deciding ability to pay.

If permitted, municipalities may outsource fine collection to private entities that violate the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition on threatening incarceration for inability to pay.

If permitted to outsource fee collection, municipalities may contract with private entities that violate the constitutional bar on threatening incarceration for inability to pay.

If municipalities can use garnishment and similar methods to collect fines, this may increase the risk of abuse in collections and, if successful in raising revenue, encourage frivolous cases.

If municipalities are permitted to use procedures like garnishment to collect fees, this potentially increases the risk of abuse in collections and, if successful in raising revenue, encourages frivolous cases.