Utah Earns “C-” In “Policing for Profit” Report
Arlington, Va.—It’s called policing for profit and it’s happening all across America. Utah earned an average overall grade for its laws and practices—but its poor laws invite abuse and are in need of reform.
Under a practice called “civil forfeiture,” police and prosecutors’ offices seize private property—often without ever charging the owners with a crime, much less convicting them of one—then keep or sell what they’ve taken and use the profits to fund their budgets. And considering law enforcement officials in most states don’t report the value of what they collect or how that bounty is spent, the issue raises serious questions about both government transparency and accountability.
Under state and federal civil asset forfeiture laws, law enforcement agencies can seize and keep property suspected of involvement in criminal activity. Unlike criminal asset forfeiture, however, with civil forfeiture, a property owner need not be found guilty of a crime—or even charged—to permanently lose her cash, car, home or other property.
According to the Institute for Justice—whose fight against eminent domain abuse raised that issue to national prominence—civil asset forfeiture is one of the worst abuses of property rights in our nation today. The Institute for Justice today released a first-of-its-kind national study on civil forfeiture abuse. The report—Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture (http://www.ij.org/PolicingForProfitPDF)—is the most comprehensive national study to examine the use and abuse of civil asset forfeiture and the first study to grade the civil forfeiture laws of all 50 states and the federal government. The report finds, not surprisingly, that by giving law enforcement a direct financial incentive in pursuing forfeitures and stacking the legal deck against property owners, most state and federal laws encourage policing for profit rather than seeking the neutral administration of justice. (For additional resources on this report, visit: http://www.ij.org/PolicingForProfit. For a brief video on this topic, visit: www.ij.org/Forfeiture.)
Laws Stacked Against Property Owners
The report demonstrates that legal procedures make civil forfeiture relatively easy for most governments and difficult for many property owners to fight. The vast majority of states and the federal government use a standard of proof—what is needed to successfully prosecute a forfeiture action—lower than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard required to prove an individual was guilty of the criminal activity that supposedly justified the taking of his property. Given that situation, it is not surprising that upwards of 80 percent of forfeitures at the federal level occur absent a prosecution.
“Americans are supposed to be innocent until proven guilty, but civil forfeiture turns that principle on its head,” said Institute for Justice Senior Attorney Scott Bullock, a co-author of the report. “With civil forfeiture, your property is guilty until you prove it innocent.”
Grading Forfeiture Laws and How Government Evades Them
In Policing for Profit, IJ grades each state on its forfeiture laws and other measures of abuse. Only three states (Maine, North Dakota and Vermont) earned a grade of B or better.
Federal forfeiture law makes the problem worse with so-called “equitable sharing.” Under these arrangements, state officials can hand over forfeiture prosecutions to the federal government and then receive up to 80 percent of the proceeds—even when state law bans or limits the profit incentive. Equitable sharing payments to states have nearly doubled from 2000 to 2008, from a little more than $200 million to $400 million.
Policing for Profit was co-authored by IJ’s Scott Bullock and criminal justice researchers Drs. Marian Williams and Jefferson Holcomb of Appalachian State University and Tomislav Kovandzic of the University of Texas at Dallas. The university professors examined equitable sharing data and found clear evidence that law enforcement is acting in pursuit of profit. When state laws make forfeiture harder and less profitable, state and local law enforcement engages in more equitable sharing to circumvent the state laws.
Utah’s Law & Practices
Utah earned average overall marks for its civil forfeiture laws and practices according to IJ’s rankings, but by allowing law enforcement to profit from forfeiture, Utah invites abuse. From 2000 to 2004, Utah law was relatively protective of property owners, but no longer. Today, while the government must prove property is related to a crime subject to forfeiture by clear and convincing evidence—a relatively high standard—and the government bears the burden in innocent owner contests for most forfeitures, 100 percent of property seized and forfeited in connection with alleged controlled substance offenses is allocated to law enforcement through the Crime Reduction Assistance Program. These laws are partly the product of a sustained effort by law enforcement to reverse a voter initiative protecting property rights. In 2000, nearly 70 percent of Utah voters passed a measure that eliminated allocation of forfeited money to law enforcement. But law enforcement was determined. Rather than obey the new law, some county prosecutors persisted in diverting forfeited money into their own accounts. Pressure from a group of citizens helped end this practice. Unable to use the proceeds from forfeiture, police signaled that they no longer had as much interest in the practice. One officer remarked that “[d]oing forfeiture [was now] way down the line in [his] priorities.” But then in 2004, the police succeeded in having the initiative overturned by the state legislature, so now 100 percent of proceeds once again go to police and prosecutors. Despite a requirement that information on the use of forfeiture be collected, Utah officials did not respond to requests for data. For analysis of Utah’s ranking, visit: http://www.ij.org/PolicingForProfit/UT.
To end policing for profit, the Institute for Justice recommends that, first, law enforcement should be required to convict people before taking their property. Law enforcement agencies could still prosecute criminals and forfeit their ill-gotten possessions—but the rights of innocent property owners would be protected. Second, police and prosecutors shouldn’t be paid on commission. To end the perverse profit incentive, forfeiture revenue must be placed in a neutral fund, like a state’s general fund. It should also be tracked and reported so law enforcement is held publicly accountable. Finally, equitable sharing must be abolished to ensure that when states act to limit forfeiture abuse, law enforcement cannot evade the new rules and continue pocketing forfeiture money.