Designing Cartels Through Censorship

Business interests sometimes use titling laws – laws establishing who can use professional titles – as a form of occupational regulation to restrict entry. Such laws allow practitioners to provide services without a license, but deny them the ability to communicate openly to the public about those services. Because legislators typically see titling laws as less restrictive than licensure, industry leaders pursue them as an initial and more acceptable form of regulation. Once the laws are in place, insiders then seek to transform them into full licensure, which provides an even stronger barrier to entry.

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Suggested citation: Carpenter, D. M., & Ross, J. K. (2008). Designing cartels through censorship. Regulation, 31(2), 14–18. https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2008/6/v31n2-3.pdf