Low bar to forfeit: Prosecutors must prove by preponderance of the evidence that property is connected to a crime.
Poor protections for the innocent: Third-party owners must prove their own innocence to recover seized property.
Large profit incentive: 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement.
Between 2000 and 2019, the Department of Justice forfeited more than $30.8 billion and the Department of the Treasury forfeited nearly $15 billion, for a total of at least $45.7 billion in total forfeiture revenue.
At least $45.7 billion in forfeiture revenue
2000–2019
Year | Assets Forfeiture Fund Deposits | Treasury Forfeiture Fund Deposits | Total | |
---|---|---|---|---|
2000 | $440,100,000 | $170,997,000 | $611,097,000 | |
2001 | $406,800,000 | $92,873,000 | $499,673,000 | |
2002 | $423,600,000 | $147,878,000 | $571,478,000 | |
2003 | $486,000,000 | $194,854,000 | $680,854,000 | |
2004 | $543,100,000 | $271,565,000 | $814,665,000 | |
2005 | $595,500,000 | $258,636,000 | $854,136,000 | |
2006 | $1,124,900,000 | $214,651,000 | $1,339,551,000 | |
2007 | $1,515,700,000 | $252,192,000 | $1,767,892,000 | |
2008 | $1,286,000,000 | $464,762,000 | $1,750,762,000 | |
2009 | $1,444,568,000 | $516,736,000 | $1,961,304,000 | |
2010 | $1,573,330,000 | $959,767,000 | $2,533,097,000 | |
2011 | $1,737,965,000 | $817,154,000 | $2,555,119,000 | |
2012 | $4,314,710,000 | $397,002,000 | $4,711,712,000 | |
2013 | $2,012,249,000 | $1,612,361,000 | $3,624,610,000 | |
2014 | $4,467,127,000 | $736,531,000 | $5,203,658,000 | |
2015 | $1,622,651,000 | $4,595,733,000 | $6,218,384,000 | |
2016 | $1,886,918,000 | $773,314,000 | $2,660,232,000 | |
2017 | $1,586,422,000 | $458,606,000 | $2,045,028,000 | |
2018 | $1,276,170,000 | $1,188,465,000 | $2,464,635,000 | |
2019 | $2,070,452,000 | $802,066,000 | $2,872,518,000 | |
Totals | $30,814,262,000 | $14,926,143,000 | $45,740,405,000 |
All revenue figures include both civil and criminal forfeitures. Revenues are not adjusted for inflation.
From 2015 to 2019, half of DOJ’s currency forfeitures were worth less than $12,090. Federal policy does not typically permit cash seizures and forfeitures under $5,000 unless the person from whom the cash was seized is or was being criminally prosecuted.
From 2000 to 2019, 23% of DOJ’s forfeitures were of currency; an additional 40% were of weapons and ammunition.
From 2000 to 2019, at least 84% of DOJ’s forfeited properties were processed under civil, not criminal, forfeiture laws.
From 2015 to 2019, DOJ spent $7 billion from forfeiture funds, close to a third on third-party compensation and more than a fifth on equitable sharing payments.
From 2015 to 2016, half of Treasury’s currency forfeitures were worth less than $7,320. Federal policy does not typically permit cash seizures and forfeitures under $5,000 unless the person from whom the cash was seized is or was being criminally prosecuted.
From 2000 to 2016, 64% of Treasury’s forfeitures were of conveyances, mostly vehicles, but 67% of proceeds were from currency.
From 2000 to 2016, at least 98% of Treasury’s forfeited properties were processed under civil, not criminal, forfeiture laws. Nearly all of Treasury’s civil forfeiture cases were administrative.
Treasury does not report how forfeiture funds are spent.
Revenue data are from DOJ’s Annual Financial Statements, available on its website. Data represent all forfeiture revenues deposited into DOJ’s Assets Forfeiture Fund and include proceeds shared with state and local law enforcement as part of the equitable sharing program. Expenditures are from DOJ’s annual reports to Congress, also available on the Department’s website. Third parties include innocent owners, lienholders, banks and victims. Other figures were calculated using DOJ’s Consolidated Asset Tracking System and are presented in calendar years.
Standard of proof: Preponderance of the evidence.
18 U.S.C. § 983(c).
Innocent owner burden: Owner.
18 U.S.C. § 983(d).
Financial incentive: 100%.
18 U.S.C. § 981(e); see also United States v. Pescatore, 637 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2011).