The Federal Government earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws.
Standard of Proof
Low bar to forfeit: Prosecutors must prove by preponderance of the evidence that property is connected to a crime.
Innocent Owner Burden
Poor protections for the innocent: Third-party owners must prove their own innocence to recover seized property.
Financial Incentive
Large profit incentive: 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement.
The letter grade reflects federal forfeiture laws as of May 7, 2025. When we become aware of relevant reforms, we are updating the standard of proof, innocent owner burden, and financial incentive language above, but we are not updating the letter grade.
Note: Prosecutors need only meet their standard of proof—and owners can only prove their innocence—if owners make it to a judicial hearing. See flow chart.
Recent Reforms
Recommendations
What happens after personal property is seized by the federal government under CAFRA?
Under CAFRA, the government’s and owners’ deadlines leading to a judicial hearing add up to 326 days, but there is no deadline for the hearing itself and possible extensions may add to the wait. While you wait, the government has your property, but you can try to get it back while the case continues by requesting a hardship release. You can also seek a pardon of the property.
*Within 30 days of receiving notice, you can, instead of or in addition to filing a claim, file a petition for remission or mitigation with the seizing agency, effectively admitting that the property can be forfeited but asking that it nevertheless be returned because you are an innocent owner or suffer hardship without it.
For research methods and limitations, see “How We Documented Civil Forfeiture Processes From Seizure to Hearing.”
What happens after personal property is seized by the federal government for a customs violation?
Under federal law for customs forfeitures, the government’s and owners’ deadlines leading to a judicial hearing add up to 166 days, but the wait may be longer as deadlines are not specified for providing notice, filing the complaint, or the hearing itself. While you wait, the government has your property, and you can only try to get it back by seeking a pardon of the property.
*Within 30 days of receiving notice, instead of or in addition to filing a claim, you can file a petition for remission or mitigation with the seizing agency, effectively admitting the property can be forfeited but nevertheless asking that it be returned because you are an innocent owner or suffer hardship.
For research methods and limitations, see “How We Documented Civil Forfeiture Processes From Seizure to Hearing.”
Deposits to Federal Forfeiture Funds, 2000-2023
At least $57.4 billion in forfeiture revenue
| Year | DOJ Assets Forfeiture Fund Deposits | Treasury Forfeiture Fund Deposits | Total National Deposits |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2000 | $440,100,000 | $170,997,000 | $611,097,000 |
| 2001 | $406,800,000 | $92,873,000 | $499,673,000 |
| 2002 | $423,600,000 | $147,878,000 | $571,478,000 |
| 2003 | $486,000,000 | $194,854,000 | $680,854,000 |
| 2004 | $543,100,000 | $271,565,000 | $814,665,000 |
| 2005 | $595,500,000 | $258,636,000 | $854,136,000 |
| 2006 | $1,124,900,000 | $214,651,000 | $1,339,551,000 |
| 2007 | $1,515,700,000 | $252,192,000 | $1,767,892,000 |
| 2008 | $1,286,000,000 | $464,762,000 | $1,750,762,000 |
| 2009 | $1,444,568,000 | $516,736,000 | $1,961,304,000 |
| 2010 | $1,573,330,000 | $959,767,000 | $2,533,097,000 |
| 2011 | $1,737,965,000 | $817,154,000 | $2,555,119,000 |
| 2012 | $4,314,710,000 | $397,002,000 | $4,711,712,000 |
| 2013 | $2,012,249,000 | $1,612,361,000 | $3,624,610,000 |
| 2014 | $4,467,127,000 | $736,531,000 | $520,365,000 |
| 2015 | $1,622,651,000 | $4,595,733,000 | $6,218,384,000 |
| 2016 | $1,886,918,000 | $773,314,000 | $2,660,232,000 |
| 2017 | $1,586,422,000 | $458,606,000 | $2,045,028,000 |
| 2018 | $1,276,170,000 | $1,188,465,000 | $2,464,635,000 |
| 2019 | $2,070,452,000 | $802,066,000 | $2,872,518,000 |
| 2020 | $1,693,660,000 | $474,542,000 | $2,168,202,000 |
| 2021 | $1,420,815,000 | $770,423,000 | $2,191,238,000 |
| 2022 | $1,749,488,000 | $1,097,555,000 | $2,847,043,000 |
| 2023 | $3,184,871,000 | $1,310,599,000 | $4,495,470,000 |
| Totals | $38,863,096,000 | $18,579,262,000 | $57,442,358,000 |
All revenue figures include both civil and criminal forfeitures. Revenues are not adjusted for inflation.
Federal Equitable Sharing
Since 2000, the federal government has distributed more than $10.3 billion in equitable sharing proceeds to state and local law enforcement agencies nationwide, about $8 billion from the Department of Justice and $2.3 billion from the Department of the Treasury. On average from 2019 to 2023, an estimated 5,426 state and local law enforcement agencies, or nearly a third of all such agencies in the country, were certified to participate in equitable sharing. Data from the DOJ indicate it nearly always grants agencies’ requests for proceeds—and usually gives them the full amount they ask for. (Treasury data are not available.)
Department of Justice Forfeitures: Key Facts
Median Value
$13,695
From 2019 to 2023, half of DOJ’s currency forfeitures were worth less than $13,695.
Federal policy does not typically permit cash seizures and forfeitures under $5,000 unless the person from whom the cash was seized is or was being criminally prosecuted.
Property Type
From 2000 to 2023, 69% of DOJ’s revenue-generating forfeitures were of currency.
Revenue-generating forfeitures exclude properties required to be destroyed, such as guns, ammunition, and contraband.
Proceeding Type
From 2000 to 2023, 71% of DOJ’s revenue-generating forfeitures were processed administratively.
Revenue-generating forfeitures exclude properties required to be destroyed, such as guns, ammunition, and contraband.
Equitable Sharing Requests Granted
From 2000 to 2023, when funds were available, DOJ granted 99% of state and local agency requests for equitable sharing.
Department of Treasury Forfeitures: Key Facts
Median Value
$7,320
From 2015 to 2016, half of Treasury’s currency forfeitures were worth less than $7,320.
Federal policy does not typically permit cash seizures and forfeitures under $5,000 unless the person from whom the cash was seized is or was being criminally prosecuted.
Property Type
From 2000 to 2016, 64% of Treasury’s forfeitures were of conveyances, mostly vehicles, but 67% of proceeds were from currency.
Property Type
From 2000 to 2016, at least 96% of Treasury’s forfeitures were processed administratively.
This is after excluding cases involving counterfeit and other prohibited goods (as well as all summary contraband forfeitures), which are less likely to be contested and thus more likely to end in forfeiture by default.
Additional Findings
UNKNOWN
Treasury does not make its forfeiture data public. Data for 2000 to 2016 were obtained after a multiyear lawsuit.
Department of Justice Forfeiture Transparency and Accountability Report Card
Tracking Seized Property
A-
Aggregate Forfeiture Reports
A
Penalties for Failure to File a Report
F*
Accounting for Forfeiture Fund Spending
C
Accessibility of Forfeiture Records
A
Financial Audits of Forfeiture Accounts
A
*Agencies must file even when they have nothing to report.
For full transparency and accountability grades, visit ij.org/TransparencyReportCards.
Treasury Forfeiture Transparency and Accountability Report Card
Tracking Seized Property
C
Aggregate Forfeiture Reports
B
Penalties for Failure to File a Report
F*
Accounting for Forfeiture Fund Spending
C
Accessibility of Forfeiture Records
A
Financial Audits of Forfeiture Accounts
A
*Agencies must file even when they have nothing to report.
For full transparency and accountability grades, visit ij.org/TransparencyReportCards.
Data Notes
Department of Justice
Revenue data are from DOJ’s Annual Financial Statements, available on its website. Data represent all forfeiture revenues deposited into DOJ’s Assets Forfeiture Fund and include proceeds shared with state and local law enforcement as part of the equitable sharing program. Other figures were calculated using DOJ’s Consolidated Asset Tracking System and are presented in calendar years. In recent years, CATS has experienced a lag in data reporting that could have minor and unclear impacts on median, property type, and proceeding type calculations.
Treasury
Revenue data are from Treasury’s Annual Financial Statements, available on its website. Data represent all non-tax forfeiture revenues deposited into the Treasury Forfeiture Fund from Treasury and Department of Homeland Security agencies and include proceeds shared with state and local law enforcement as part of the equitable sharing program. Other figures were calculated using U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Seized Assets and Case Tracking System and are presented in calendar years.
Legal Sources
Standard of Proof: Preponderance of the evidence.
18 U.S.C. § 983(c).
Innocent owner burden: Owner.
18 U.S.C. § 983(d).
Financial incentive: 100%.
18 U.S.C. § 981(e); see also United States v. Pescatore, 637 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2011).
Process:
CAFRA: 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 et seq. (forfeiture procedure); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (service of complaint); 55 (default judgment) Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. C, E, G (supplemental rules of procedure); see 28 C.F.R. §§ 9.3, 9.5 (petitions for remission or mitigation).
Customs: 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602–19 (customs forfeiture procedure); id. § 1621 (statute of limitations); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (service of complaint); Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. C, E, G (supplemental rules of procedure); see 18 U.S.C. § 983(i) (exemption of customs forfeiture from CAFRA); 28 C.F.R. §§ 9.3, 9.5 (petitions for remission or mitigation).