Oklahoma earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws
Standard of Proof
Low bar to forfeit: Prosecutors must prove by preponderance of the evidence that property is connected to a crime.
Innocent Owner Burden
Poor protections for the innocent: Third-party owners must prove their own innocence to recover seized property.
Financial Incentive
Large profit incentive: Up to 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement.
The letter grade reflects Oklahoma’s forfeiture laws as of May 7, 2025. When we become aware of relevant reforms, we are updating the standard of proof, innocent owner burden, and financial incentive language above, but we are not updating the letter grade.
Note: Prosecutors need only meet their standard of proof—and owners can only prove their innocence—if owners make it to a judicial hearing. See flow chart.
Recent Reforms
Recommendations
What happens after personal property is seized in Oklahoma?
Under Oklahoma law, the government’s and owners’ deadlines leading to a judicial hearing add up to 225 days, but the wait may be longer as deadlines are not specified for filing the complaint or for the hearing itself. While you wait, the government has your property, and you have no way to seek its return.
For research methods and limitations, see “How We Documented Civil Forfeiture Processes From Seizure to Hearing.”
State and Federal Forfeiture Proceeds, 2000–2023
At least $237 million in state and federal forfeiture revenue
| Year | Oklahoma Forfeiture Revenues | Dept. of Justice Equitable Sharing Proceeds | Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000 | $4,455,877 | $1,384,903 | $0 | $5,840,780 |
| 2001 | $5,095,149 | $729,415 | $0 | $5,824,564 |
| 2002 | $5,034,098 | $5,754,965 | $8,000 | $10,797,063 |
| 2003 | $8,357,122 | $6,418,639 | $6,000 | $14,781,761 |
| 2004 | $9,039,476 | $5,630,156 | $13,000 | $14,682,632 |
| 2005 | $7,864,793 | $7,158,850 | $142,000 | $15,165,643 |
| 2006 | $7,886,299 | $6,569,517 | $21,000 | $14,476,816 |
| 2007 | $8,054,586 | $6,189,501 | $5,000 | $14,249,087 |
| 2008 | $7,906,582 | $2,579,483 | $63,000 | $10,549,065 |
| 2009 | $5,575,368 | $5,173,845 | $249,000 | $10,998,213 |
| 2010 | $6,964,132 | $2,679,518 | $114,000 | $9,757,650 |
| 2011 | $6,247,284 | $4,185,955 | $739,000 | $11,172,239 |
| 2012 | $4,310,089 | $2,649,990 | $1,000,000 | $7,960,079 |
| 2013 | $6,580,718 | $2,361,790 | $155,000 | $9,097,508 |
| 2014 | $5,710,484 | $2,305,791 | $774,000 | $8,790,275 |
| 2015 | $4,680,244 | $1,163,078 | $473,000 | $6,316,322 |
| 2016 | $5,312,756 | $2,046,368 | $68,000 | $7,427,124 |
| 2017 | $7,746,556 | $787,187 | $1,434,000 | $9,967,743 |
| 2018 | $7,139,947 | $1,481,230 | $363,000 | $8,984,177 |
| 2019 | $4,780,552 | $1,820,964 | $164,000 | $6,765,516 |
| 2020 | $5,174,064 | $499,605 | $1,655,000 | $7,328,669 |
| 2021 | $6,417,437 | $329,564 | $519,000 | $7,266,001 |
| 2022 | $6,877,542 | $1,513,870 | $487,000 | $8,878,412 |
| 2023 | $7,382,300 | $3,065,392 | $410,000 | $10,857,692 |
| Totals | $154,593,455 | $74,479,576 | $8,862,000 | $237,935,031 |
All revenue figures include both civil and criminal forfeitures. Revenues are not adjusted for inflation.
Federal Equitable Sharing
Oklahoma does not prevent state and local law enforcement agencies from using the federal equitable sharing program to circumvent state forfeiture law. Since 2000, Oklahoma agencies have generated more than $83 million in equitable sharing proceeds from the departments of Justice and the Treasury. And on average from 2019 to 2023, more than 55 Oklahoma agencies, or an estimated 13% of all law enforcement agencies in the state, were certified for the program.
Forfeitures Under Oklahoma Law: Key Facts
Median Value
UNKNOWN
Oklahoma does not report property-level data necessary to calculate median forfeiture value.
Property Types
UNKNOWN
Oklahoma does not report the types of property forfeited.
Proceeding Types
UNKNOWN
Oklahoma does not report whether forfeitures are processed under civil or criminal forfeiture law.
Outlier Judicial District
From 2019 to 2023, Oklahoma’s Judicial District 1, composed of border counties in the panhandle typically with populations below 5,000, forfeited 13 times as much per resident as the typical judicial district.
Forfeiture Transparency and Accountability Report Card
Tracking Seized Property
D+Statewide Forfeiture Reports
CPenalties for Failure to File a Report
FAccounting for Forfeiture Fund Spending
BAccessibility of Forfeiture Records
DFinancial Audits of Forfeiture Accounts
FFor full transparency and accountability grades, visit ij.org/TransparencyReportCards.
Data Notes
Forfeiture reports for district attorneys statewide were obtained via public records requests to the state District Attorneys Council. Revenues for 2019–2023 represent proceeds of forfeited currency and property sold received in a fiscal year. Earlier years include court-ordered assessments and other income but otherwise use the same methodology. Equitable sharing data are from DOJ’s and Treasury’s annual forfeiture reports. Due to differences in reporting and accounting practices, figures may not match aggregate numbers produced by the state or cover the same 12-month period as the federal data. The number of certified agencies was computed using the approved Equitable Sharing Agreement and Certification requests submitted by police, sheriff, and other local law enforcement agencies. The percentage of certified agencies was computed using that number and the total number of agencies reported in the 2018 Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies.
Legal Sources
Standard of proof: Preponderance of the evidence.
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-503(B)–(C).
Innocent owner burden: Owner.
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-503(A)(4)(b), (A)(7); State ex rel. Campbell v. $18,235, 184 P.3d 1078, 1081 (Okla. 2008).
Financial incentive: Up to 100%.
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, §§ 2-503(F)(2), -506(L), -508.
Process: Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-506 (forfeiture procedure); id. tit. 12, §§ 95(A)(4) (statute of limitations), 2004(I) (service of complaint).

