Oregon earns a C for its civil forfeiture laws.

Standard of Proof

Higher bar to forfeit in limited cases: Weak conviction provision falls short of criminal forfeiture. It applies only if an owner contests forfeiture, putting the burden on owners to engage in a costly legal battle and making it easy for the government to forfeit without a conviction. It does not require conviction of the owner, only of “a person.” Once the conviction provision is satisfied, personal property must be linked to the crime by preponderance of the evidence; real property by clear and convincing evidence.

Innocent Owner Burden

Stronger protections for the innocent: Generally, the government must prove third-party owners knew about criminal activity connected to their property, but if cash, weapons, or negotiable instruments were found near drugs, the owner bears the burden.

Financial Incentive

Large profit incentive: 52.5% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement when forfeiture is pursued by local agencies; 47% when forfeiture is pursued by the state.

  • None

Recommendations

  • End civil forfeiture
  • Direct all forfeiture proceeds to a non-law enforcement fund
  • Close the equitable sharing loophole
  • Strengthen transparency and accountability requirements
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What happens after personal property is seized in Oregon? 

Under Oregon law, the government’s and owners’ deadlines leading to a judicial hearing add up to 81 days, but there are no deadlines for serving the complaint or for the hearing itself and any criminal proceedings may add to the wait. While you wait, the government has your property, but if you act quickly, you can try to get it back by requesting a probable cause hearing or a preliminary hearing. 

State and Federal Forfeiture Proceeds, 2000–2023

At least $90 million in state and federal forfeiture revenue

Year Oregon Forfeiture Revenues Dept. of Justice Equitable Sharing Proceeds Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds Total
2000 $1,642,449 $830,027 $607,000 $3,079,476
2001 $1,935,800 $655,252 $46,000 $2,637,052
2002 $191,083 $3,557 $826,000 $1,020,640
2003 $725,740 $644,153 $1,322,000 $2,691,893
2004 $1,021,077 $477,160 $449,000 $1,947,237
2005 Unknown $668,926 $920,000 $1,588,926
2006 Unknown $564,374 $528,000 $1,092,374
2007 Unknown $1,881,774 $727,000 $2,608,774
2008 Unknown $1,024,763 $896,000 $1,920,763
2009 Unknown $1,551,431 $1,486,000 $3,037,431
2010 $1,996,498 $1,724,575 $974,000 $4,695,073
2011 $2,128,528 $2,155,667 $656,000 $4,940,195
2012 $1,573,074 $1,621,348 $730,000 $3,924,422
2013 $1,937,907 $1,961,146 $436,000 $4,335,053
2014 $1,224,379 $1,699,945 $1,156,000 $4,080,324
2015 $1,442,571 $2,472,642 $1,462,000 $5,377,213
2016 $534,987 $1,627,632 $842,000 $3,004,619
2017 $854,965 $1,097,933 $697,000 $2,649,898
2018 $1,220,124 $1,762,479 $294,000 $3,276,603
2019 $1,118,199 $1,565,833 $1,046,000 $3,730,032
2020 $1,048,431 $2,476,018 $3,651,000 $7,175,449
2021 $1,132,104 $2,179,745 $1,283,000 $4,594,849
2022 $1,455,521 $2,805,547 $4,837,000 $9,098,068
2023 $1,230,708 $4,992,792 $1,941,000 $8,164,500
Totals $24,414,145 $38,444,719 $27,812,000 $90,670,864

Federal Equitable Sharing

Oregon does not prevent state and local law enforcement agencies from using the federal equitable sharing program to circumvent state forfeiture law. Since 2000, Oregon agencies have generated more than $66 million in equitable sharing proceeds from the departments of Justice and the Treasury. And on average from 2019 to 2023, more than 48 Oregon agencies, or an estimated 31% of all law enforcement agencies in the state, were certified for the program.

Forfeitures Under Oregon Law: Key Facts

Median Value

$2,008

From 2019 to 2023, half of Oregon’s currency forfeitures were worth less than $2,008.

Property Values

From 2019 to 2023, nearly 80% of Oregon’s forfeitures were of currency.

Proceeding Types

From 2019 to 2023, 83% of Oregon’s forfeitures were processed under civil, not criminal, forfeiture laws.

Claims

From 2019 to 2023, only 10% of forfeitures were contested via a claim. And vehicle forfeitures were about four times as likely to be contested as currency forfeitures.

Forfeiture Transparency and Accountability Report Card

Tracking Seized Property
B
Statewide Forfeiture Reports
A
Penalties for Failure to File a Report
F
Accounting for Forfeiture Fund Spending
A
Accessibility of Forfeiture Records
B
Financial Audits of Forfeiture Accounts
F
Data Notes

Statewide forfeiture records with property-level data were obtained via public records requests to the state Criminal Justice Commission. All figures are in calendar years. Revenues for 2010–2023 represent the value of forfeited currency and property sold or retained in a year. Revenues for earlier years do not include property retained. The CJC reportedly lacked funds to produce reports for 2005–2009. Equitable sharing data are from DOJ’s and Treasury’s annual forfeiture reports. Due to differences in reporting and accounting practices, figures may not match aggregate numbers produced by the state or cover the same 12-month period as the federal data. The number of certified agencies was computed using the approved Equitable Sharing Agreement and Certification requests submitted by police, sheriff, and other local law enforcement agencies. The percentage of certified agencies was computed using that number and the total number of agencies reported in the 2018 Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies.

Legal Sources

Standard of proof: Weak conviction provision does not require conviction of an owner, but only of “a person.” The provision applies only when forfeiture is contested. After the conviction provision is satisfied, personal property must be linked to the crime by a preponderance of the evidence, and real property by clear and convincing evidence.

Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 131A.255(1)–(3), .315.

Innocent owner burden: Government. The government bears the burden of proof except in cases where cash, weapons or negotiable instruments were found in close proximity to drugs, in which cases the owner bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the items are not the proceeds or instrumentalities of a drug crime.

Or. Rev. Stat. § 131A.255(2), (5).

Financial incentive: 52.5% when forfeiture is pursued by local law enforcement; 47% when forfeiture is pursued by the state.

Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 131A.360(1), (4), (6), .365(1), (3), (5).

Process: Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 131A.005 et seq. (forfeiture procedure); see Or. R. Civ. P. 5 (service of complaint), 7 (time to answer).