Delaware
Policing for Profit
Delaware earns a D- for its civil forfeiture laws.
Low bar to forfeit: Once the government seizes property, the owner must prove by preponderance of the evidence that it is not connected to a crime.
Poor protections for the innocent: Third-party owners must prove their own innocence to recover seized property.
Large profit incentive: Up to 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement.
The letter grade reflects the state’s forfeiture laws as of December 2020. When we become aware of relevant reforms, we are updating the standard of proof, innocent owner burden and financial incentive language above, but we are not updating the letter grade.
Recent Reforms
- (2016) HB 309: Made information about the Special Law Enforcement Assistance Fund eligible for release under Freedom of Information Act. Unfortunately, the SLEAF Committee decides which requests to approve. Moreover, Delaware’s FOIA does not guarantee access to records for non-citizens of the state.
Recommendations
- End civil forfeiture
- Direct all forfeiture proceeds to a non-law enforcement fund
- Strengthen protections for innocent third-party owners
- Close the equitable sharing loophole
- Strengthen transparency and accountability requirements
State and Federal Forfeiture Revenues, 2000-2019
Between 2017 and 2019, Delaware law enforcement agencies forfeited more than $4 million under state law. Between 2000 and 2019, they generated an additional $16 million from federal equitable sharing, for a total of at least $20 million in forfeiture revenue. Delaware ranks 13th for its participation in the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program. The state does not prevent state and local agencies from using equitable sharing to circumvent state forfeiture law.
At least $20 million in state and federal forfeiture revenue
2000–2019
| Year | Delaware Forfeiture Revenues | Dept. of Justice Equitable Sharing Proceeds | Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds |
$0 ↦
$2,687,170
|
Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000 | Unknown | $449,374 | $61,000 | $510,374 | |
| 2001 | Unknown | $461,175 | $9,000 | $470,175 | |
| 2002 | Unknown | $422,941 | $0 | $422,941 | |
| 2003 | Unknown | $173,222 | $0 | $173,222 | |
| 2004 | Unknown | $606,678 | $0 | $606,678 | |
| 2005 | Unknown | $791,700 | $11,000 | $802,700 | |
| 2006 | Unknown | $130,302 | $4,000 | $134,302 | |
| 2007 | Unknown | $478,764 | $55,000 | $533,764 | |
| 2008 | Unknown | $813,464 | $70,000 | $883,464 | |
| 2009 | Unknown | $520,031 | $62,000 | $582,031 | |
| 2010 | Unknown | $663,934 | $218,000 | $881,934 | |
| 2011 | Unknown | $1,129,733 | $315,000 | $1,444,733 | |
| 2012 | Unknown | $1,113,015 | $84,000 | $1,197,015 | |
| 2013 | Unknown | $500,724 | $365,000 | $865,724 | |
| 2014 | Unknown | $2,573,778 | $12,000 | $2,585,778 | |
| 2015 | Unknown | $331,134 | $101,000 | $432,134 | |
| 2016 | Unknown | $1,200,737 | $26,000 | $1,226,737 | |
| 2017 | $1,575,401 | $349,045 | $66,000 | $1,990,446 | |
| 2018 | $1,376,901 | $1,310,269 | $0 | $2,687,170 | |
| 2019 | $1,176,260 | $412,246 | $11,000 | $1,599,506 | |
| Totals | $4,128,562 | $14,432,266 | $1,470,000 |
State
Department of Justice
Treasury
|
$20,030,828 |
Delaware Forfeiture Transparency and Accountability Report Card
| F | Tracking Seized Property |
|---|---|
| A | Accounting for Forfeiture Fund Spending |
| B | Statewide Forfeiture Reports |
| C | Accessibility of Forfeiture Records |
|---|---|
| B | Penalties for Failure to File a Report |
| F | Financial Audits of Forfeiture Accounts |
Forfeitures Under Delaware Law: Key Facts
Median Value
UnknownDelaware does not report property-level data necessary to calculate median forfeiture value.
Property Types
UnknownDelaware does not report the types of property forfeited.
Civil vs. Criminal
UnknownDelaware does not report whether forfeitures are processed under civil or criminal forfeiture law.
Expenditures
UnknownDelaware expenditure data were not used for this report.
Data Notes
Reports of fiscal-year forfeiture deposits to the Special Law Enforcement Assistance Fund were obtained via request to the Delaware Department of Justice. Deposits represent forfeited money and proceeds from sales of forfeited property and exclude interest. Equitable sharing data are from DOJ’s and Treasury’s annual forfeiture reports. Due to differences in reporting and accounting practices, state figures may not match aggregate numbers produced by the state or cover the same 12-month period as the federal data.
Legal Sources
Standard of proof: The government must show probable cause for the seizure, at which point a rebuttable presumption in favor of forfeiture arises. The owner can rebut that presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4784(a)–(j); Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 71.3; Brown v. State, 214 A.3d 922, 926–27 (Del. 2019); Brown v. State, 721 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Del. 1998); In re One 1987 Toyota, 621 A.2d 796, 799 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992).
Innocent owner burden: Owner.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, §§ 4784(a)(7), 4785(a); Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 71.3(d); Brown v. State, 214 A.3d 922, 926–27 (Del. 2019); Brown v. State, 721 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Del. 1998).
Financial incentive: Up to 100%.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 4110–4111; id. tit. 16, § 4784(f).