Low bar to forfeit: Once the government seizes property, the owner must prove by preponderance of the evidence that it is not connected to a crime.
Poor protections for the innocent: Third-party owners must prove their own innocence to recover seized property.
Large profit incentive: Up to 100% of forfeiture proceeds go to law enforcement.
Between 2017 and 2019, Delaware law enforcement agencies forfeited more than $4 million under state law. Between 2000 and 2019, they generated an additional $16 million from federal equitable sharing, for a total of at least $20 million in forfeiture revenue. Delaware ranks 13th for its participation in the Department of Justice’s equitable sharing program. The state does not prevent state and local agencies from using equitable sharing to circumvent state forfeiture law.
At least $20 million in state and federal forfeiture revenue
2000–2019
Year | Delaware Forfeiture Revenues | Dept. of Justice Equitable Sharing Proceeds | Treasury Equitable Sharing Proceeds | Total | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
2000 | Unknown | $449,374 | $61,000 | $510,374 | |
2001 | Unknown | $461,175 | $9,000 | $470,175 | |
2002 | Unknown | $422,941 | $0 | $422,941 | |
2003 | Unknown | $173,222 | $0 | $173,222 | |
2004 | Unknown | $606,678 | $0 | $606,678 | |
2005 | Unknown | $791,700 | $11,000 | $802,700 | |
2006 | Unknown | $130,302 | $4,000 | $134,302 | |
2007 | Unknown | $478,764 | $55,000 | $533,764 | |
2008 | Unknown | $813,464 | $70,000 | $883,464 | |
2009 | Unknown | $520,031 | $62,000 | $582,031 | |
2010 | Unknown | $663,934 | $218,000 | $881,934 | |
2011 | Unknown | $1,129,733 | $315,000 | $1,444,733 | |
2012 | Unknown | $1,113,015 | $84,000 | $1,197,015 | |
2013 | Unknown | $500,724 | $365,000 | $865,724 | |
2014 | Unknown | $2,573,778 | $12,000 | $2,585,778 | |
2015 | Unknown | $331,134 | $101,000 | $432,134 | |
2016 | Unknown | $1,200,737 | $26,000 | $1,226,737 | |
2017 | $1,575,401 | $349,045 | $66,000 | $1,990,446 | |
2018 | $1,376,901 | $1,310,269 | $0 | $2,687,170 | |
2019 | $1,176,260 | $412,246 | $11,000 | $1,599,506 | |
Totals | $4,128,562 | $14,432,266 | $1,470,000 | $20,030,828 |
All revenue figures include both civil and criminal forfeitures. Revenues are not adjusted for inflation.
Delaware does not report property-level data necessary to calculate median forfeiture value.
Delaware does not report the types of property forfeited.
Delaware does not report whether forfeitures are processed under civil or criminal forfeiture law.
Delaware expenditure data were not used for this report.
Reports of fiscal-year forfeiture deposits to the Special Law Enforcement Assistance Fund were obtained via request to the Delaware Department of Justice. Deposits represent forfeited money and proceeds from sales of forfeited property and exclude interest. Equitable sharing data are from DOJ’s and Treasury’s annual forfeiture reports. Due to differences in reporting and accounting practices, state figures may not match aggregate numbers produced by the state or cover the same 12-month period as the federal data.
Standard of proof: The government must show probable cause for the seizure, at which point a rebuttable presumption in favor of forfeiture arises. The owner can rebut that presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 4784(a)–(j); Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 71.3; Brown v. State, 214 A.3d 922, 926–27 (Del. 2019); Brown v. State, 721 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Del. 1998); In re One 1987 Toyota, 621 A.2d 796, 799 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992).
Innocent owner burden: Owner.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, §§ 4784(a)(7), 4785(a); Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 71.3(d); Brown v. State, 214 A.3d 922, 926–27 (Del. 2019); Brown v. State, 721 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Del. 1998).
Financial incentive: Up to 100%.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 4110–4111; id. tit. 16, § 4784(f).