There Is Little Evidence Forfeiture Targets Criminals

Despite frequent claims that forfeiture takes money from criminals, there is little evidence this is the case. Police and prosecutors in most jurisdictions do not report—and might not even collect—the data necessary to substantiate such claims. And the data that are available cast doubt on their veracity.

Very little of the forfeiture data we collected and analyzed for this report consistently and accurately included information necessary to show whether forfeitures were, in fact, tied to criminal convictions, prosecutions, charges, or arrests. The data often lack key details about related criminal cases, such as the types of charges, the outcomes of charges, or even whether there were charges. Instead, data are usually focused on accounting for funds generated through forfeiture activity. Even among the few states that do track and report information about any related criminal proceedings, this information often has gaps. For example, most of those states do not clearly and consistently report what charge or charges a defendant was convicted of.

What data we do have suggest most forfeitures are not targeting criminals. First, and as reported above, most forfeitures are not criminal but civil. It is far more common for the government to take the forfeiture path that does not demand even an allegation of a specific crime against a specific person, let alone against the property’s owner. This in itself calls into question whether forfeiture is targeting true criminals.

Second, the limited data we have show many forfeitures happen without convictions. In the eight states for which we have consistent data, an average of 53% of forfeitures were associated with a conviction—though not necessarily a conviction of the owner, as none of these states report who was convicted. ¹  (See Figure 30.) Even more striking, four of these states have “conviction requirements,” though, as noted elsewhere in this report, these provisions are often full of exceptions. Among the four conviction provision states, only 54% of forfeitures occurred with an accompanying conviction. ²  In short, even among states that purport to require convictions, nearly half of forfeitures on average occurred without anyone being convicted of a crime.

Figure 30: Percent of forfeitures associated with a conviction, eight states

On average across states with data, only about half of forfeitures were associated with a conviction

Note: Kansas data are from July 2019–2023, while Minnesota data are from 2023. Data for other states are from 2019–2023.

An earlier IJ study surveyed Philadelphia forfeiture victims, providing more granular data. Among respondents who lost their property to forfeiture, only a quarter were ever convicted of a crime. ³

Third, our data show the typical forfeiture is a small amount of cash—not the stuff of major busts. The most common type of forfeited property is currency, and the median amount of currency forfeited under state law is just $1,678. In Connecticut, Michigan, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, the median is less than $1,000. ⁴  Even if all the people who had small amounts of money taken from them really were criminals, there is no evidence such low-dollar forfeitures actually disrupt drug cartels or other large criminal organizations. ⁵

Finally, our data suggest forfeitures frequently stem from opportunistic seizures—not purposeful investigations into crime. Many forfeitures began as warrantless seizures during traffic stops, often on interstate highways and often involving out-of-state residents. Traveling out of state with cash, whether by automobile, train, or plane, is not a crime. ⁶  Nor is it a factor that strongly predicts criminality. ⁷  Yet this mundane behavior is used to justify forfeiture, even in the absence of contraband or arrests.

The Drug Enforcement Administration itself has implicitly recognized that such activity rarely nets criminals. In January 2025, the agency quietly shut down an airport search-and-seizure program that had victimized multiple IJ clients and repeatedly come under scrutiny from the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General for racial profiling, poor oversight, and general ineffectiveness. ⁸  The DEA said that, from 2022 to 2024, the program led to just 57 arrests—and $22 million in seized cash.By contrast, investigations specifically targeting criminal networks yielded thousands of arrests. ⁹

Such broad, opportunistic sweeps that may turn up cash but no criminals are not uncommon. As two of the fathers of modern federal civil forfeiture, who came to rue their creation, lamented, “Today, the old speed traps have all too often been replaced by forfeiture traps, where local police stop cars and seize cash and property to pay for local law enforcement efforts.” ¹⁰  

The data we gathered for this report provide telling examples. Among 13 local jurisdictions we identified with forfeiture revenue grossly disproportionate to their populations, eight have an interstate highway running through them, while another two are adjacent to a major interstate highway exchange. ¹¹  (See Figure 31.)

Figure 31: Thirteen Counties with forfeiture revenues disproportionate to their populations, 2019-2023

*These two counties are adjacent to a major interstate highway exchange.

Sparsely populated, low-crime Logan County, Kansas, perhaps best illustrates how localities can exploit proximity to an interstate highway to generate forfeiture revenue. ¹²  A one-mile section of I-70 runs through the northeast corner of the county, which has a population under 3,000. From 2019 to 2023, the sheriff’s office reported forfeiting over a million dollars, $382 per resident. ¹³  All but one of its 28 forfeitures stemmed from seizures made during warrantless searches of out-of-state residents along that tiny stretch of highway. ¹⁴

The Logan County Sheriff’s Office is not the only Kansas law enforcement agency that may be targeting out-of-state drivers on interstate highways and taking their property. For example, over the same five years, more than 80% of Kansas Highway Patrol forfeitures involved out-of-state residents, and 99% involved property seized without a warrant. These findings align with claims in a case currently before the 10th Circuit. In that case, five out-of-state residents allege KHP systematically stops drivers passing through Kansas and uses coercive practices to obtain consent to search their vehicles. ¹⁵  In the state as a whole, our data show most seizures stem from roadside stops, with nearly a third of those stops occurring on an interstate. In addition, most property seized on interstate highways is from out-of-state residents, and most of their cases end in default.

Law enforcement agencies in other states also engage in apparently opportunistic seizures. In Nebraska, for instance, a 2023 news investigation alleged the Seward County Sheriff’s Office targets out-of-state drivers on I-80 and pressures them into waiving their property rights. ¹⁶  And, indeed, our data show the sheriff’s office forfeited nearly $3.5 million, $195 per resident, from 2019 to 2023. There again, all but one of the forfeitures started as a seizure on I-80. ¹⁷  Moreover, in nearly 40%, the owners’ only “crime” was having cash sheriff’s deputies deemed suspicious.

Another example comes from South Carolina, where the Spartanburg County Sheriff’s Office annually conducted a weeklong crackdown on I-85 called “Operation Rolling Thunder.” ¹⁸  During the 2022 installment, the sheriff’s office and assisting agencies searched 144 vehicles and seized nearly a million dollars. After having multiple freedom-of-information requests denied, IJ filed a lawsuit to obtain records on those searches. Those records showed (1) agencies targeted out-of-state drivers for minor traffic infractions like driving in the left lane without actively passing another vehicle, (2) large amounts of cash were always seized if present, and (3) officers pressured drivers to sign a form waiving their property rights. Not only that, but most of the searches turned up nothing illegal. ¹⁹